d) 4th Infantry Division (unlike the other divisions, the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions are understaffed divisions), which have a total strength of 6000 officers, non-commissioned officers and men and are to be stationed in the south of the Blue Nile. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement allowed the SPLM to maintain its control over South Sudan in accordance with the 1.1.1956 border. According to this provision, SPLM troops were displaced south of the north-south border. At the same time, the agreement established the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Government of South Sudan. The agreement provides for power-sharing within the executive and legislative branches of the Government of South Sudan. Progress has been made on police reform. In June 2007, the Council of Ministers adopted the National Police Law, which would reaffirm the provision of the CPA and the INC, which created three levels of police: national, southern and state. UndP, with support from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, has begun training police and prison staff.1 The UN Police Corps continues to advise the SSPS on strategic developments, including governance and communication structures. Un police officers were in six of the 10 southern states.
The first group of 29 officers graduated in 2007. UNMIS has also received requests for assistance from five northern States for police training.2 No progress has been made in the deployment of joint integrated police units. The provisions became obsolete with the secession of South Sudan on July 9, 2011. In May 2008, Lieutenant-General Jasper Singh Lidder, Commander of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and Chairman of the Joint Military Ceasefire Monitoring Commission, confirmed “the complete relocation of 97.2 per cent of the armed forces northwards, compared with 11.3 per cent of the total Sudan People`s Liberation Army (SPLA) troops stationed north of the border”. 2 The agreement sets out the conditions for the integration of the rebels into the security forces, political representation and economic and land rights. A new fund will provide $750 million a year to poor southern and western regions for 10 years, and the chances of displaced people returning are also guaranteed. There were indications that the Sudan had purchased arms from various mechanisms after the peace process began. It has been documented that between 2003 and 2008, Sudan acquired important weapons systems as well as small arms from countries such as Russia, Belarus, China, Egypt, Iran and even From European Union countries such as France, Italy and Germany. [fn] Mike Lewis, “Skirting the Law: Sudan`s Post-CPA Arms Flows,” Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 18 (2009), accessed May 21, 2011, pp. 23-25, www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-18-Sudan-Post-CPA-Arms.
However, SPLM/A or UNMIS have not filed a complaint in this regard. China exported arms and imported Sudanese oil.1 As a result, the arms embargo provision of the agreement was never enforced. 1.13. The Parties shall endeavour to promote and disseminate the culture of peace and confidence-building measures among and between peoples and their armed forces as an integral part of ceasefire agreements and peacekeeping; I very much appreciate the honour of speaking today at the Peace Research Institute of the University of Khartoum. The American Institute for Peace, with which I am associated, is dedicated, like the PRI, to ending violent conflict and promoting peace. I think we all agree that these goals are often out of our reach. In Sudan and South Sudan, despite years of intensive negotiations, numerous agreements and the dedicated work of so many people, peace is not only elusive, but in South Sudan and parts of Sudan it has been completely lost. Nevertheless, we cannot despair or withdraw from this work. Too many people are suffering, too much potential is lost, there is too much danger of an even greater loss of life that we need to intensify our work, if at all. I therefore welcome the opportunity for our two institutes to be in close contact to see how we can intensify our efforts for peace. UNMIS continued its work with the parties with a view to achieving a comprehensive deployment and review of the armed forces. However, the deadline of 9 July 2007, by which SAF was to mark the full transfer of its troops north of the 1956 border, was not met.
Similarly, the status of SAF forces in the south is not yet final.2 Under the scrutiny of joint monitoring teams, the SPLA began moving its remaining forces to Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states in July 2007. The dispute over the demarcation of the border and who had the right to vote in the referendum in Abyei continued. As a result, a planned referendum in Abyei on its future status never took place.1 In fact, Sudan invaded and occupied Abyei in May 2011.2Jeffrey Gettleman and Josh Kron, “Warnings of All-Out War in Fight Over Sudan Town,” New York Times, May 22, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/world/africa/23sudan.html?pagewanted=a. Sudan and South Sudan had agreed to withdraw their troops from the disputed area by the end of September 2011. UN peacekeepers were stationed in the area to maintain peace as the disputed area became a focal point between north and south. Cheers erupted when government officials and a coalition of armed groups called the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) signed the agreement at a ceremony in Juba, the capital of neighboring South Sudan, on Saturday, a year after peace talks began. On April 23, 2005, the National Constitutional Review Commission (NRC) was established. NRC had 60 members. The National Congress Party and the SPLM had insisted on “applying the general power-sharing quotas agreed in the January agreement, which give them 52% and 28% of the seats respectively, so that the other parties have only 20% and no power to block decisions”.
1 Some opposition parties should not participate in the constitutional process. Nevertheless, the drafting of the transitional constitution continued rapidly with the arrival of SPLM political advisers in Khartoum.2 The Commission began its work on 30 October. April and should complete their task within six weeks. Sudan`s opposition bloc, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), also joined the constitutional drafting process after the signing of a historic agreement with Khartoum in Cairo in June 2005. It appointed 27 members to participate in the NCRC.3 The draft Transitional Constitution was adopted by the National Assembly and the SpLM National Liberation Council on 6 July 2005. The Constitution entered into force on 9 July 2005. [4] The task of peace always extends beyond the borders of Sudan and South Sudan. Conflicts within different countries merge into each other. Instability and unrest in one affect the well-being of the other. Sudan and South Sudan are no longer legally or legally linked, but as neighbors, they will still be inextricably linked. The processes of dialogue and transformation that each of them undertakes internally can therefore also cross borders and have a positive effect on the prospects for peace in both countries.
Let us renew all our efforts to achieve such peace for all Sudanese. The LRA continues to pose a threat to peace processes in South Sudan. Nevertheless, peace talks were held in June 2006 between LRA negotiators and the Ugandan government. Vice President Riek Machar paid Kony $20,000 and gave him food to ensure the rebels would leave Sudan without looting other villages. The vice president estimated that LRA fighters had left South Sudan for the Democratic Republic of Congo.1 Peace talks were taking place in South Sudan, but LRA rebels had not yet gathered in a specific area.2 Nevertheless, LRA rebels did not leave South Sudan. .