Personal insecurity in attitude occurs when a person does not know how to feel or what to do with an object or event, but wishes to feel or do something appropriate in relation to that object or event. For example, Smith cannot currently be for or against a particular bill, but wants to determine whether he is for or against the proposal so that he can vote responsibly. Implicitly, an interpersonal agreement in attitude occurs when two or more people have attitudes that can all be satisfied together, or when there is no desire, etc., they are all satisfied (1944, 4-5; 1950, 55-60), and personal “certainty” in attitude occurs when an individual has established himself or has no desire, commit to doing so. how one feels or does with a particular object or event (1963b, 191-194; 1950, 55-60). Interpersonal disagreements and personal insecurities in faith and attitude therefore differ essentially in that “the former deals with how to describe and explain things honestly; the latter deals with how they should be favored or disadvantaged, and therefore how they should be shaped by human effort” (1944, 4). The most important of the non-rational methods is called “convincing” in a somewhat broader sense. It depends on the pure and direct emotional impact of the words – emotional meaning, rhetorical cadence, appropriate metaphor, stentoric tones, stimulating or pleading, dramatic gestures, care in establishing a relationship with the listener or audience, etc. A realignment of the listener`s attitudes is not sought by the mediating stage of changing his beliefs, but by warnings, whether obvious or subtle, raw or sophisticated. (1944, 139) Not all linguistic attempts to coordinate or regulate attitudes are rational. Often, according to Stevenson, we try to shape attitudes through linguistic means other than the representation of reasons. For example, we often try to influence or coordinate attitudes by simply calling or emphasizing the purely emotional element of words, or perhaps by using metaphor, intonation, conviviality of language or rhythm, etc. These are all non-rational, but still linguistic methods of defining and coordinating attitudes that Stevenson calls “persuasion”: other objections to equal weight view are not related to another particular view of disagreement, and some apply to more than equal weight view. In this section, we briefly address some of these objections.
Kelly (2005) argues that while 3 is proof of 2, it is not proof of 1. If 3 is not proof of 1, then learning 3 (discovering peer disagreement) does not provide evidence relevant to the disputed statement. If learning peer disagreement does not affect the evidence relevant to the disputed statement, then such a discovery does not result in a change for which the doxastic attitude is justified for peers to turn to the target proposition. From this perspective, discovering disagreements between peers makes no difference to what you should believe about the controversial proposal. Stevenson`s fourth argument that moral disagreements essentially involve disagreements in attitudes is based on the “obvious role” that disagreements play in attitudes in unifying moral disagreements; Therefore, this argument can be called a “unification argument”. According to Stevenson, disagreement in attitude forces beliefs to become a “characteristic type or organization” that could be used to resolve moral disagreements, and is therefore the one that most distinguishes ethical questions from scientific questions (1944, 13; see also 1948b, 4). Disagreements of attitude unite moral disagreements in at least two ways. First, attitudinal disagreement determines which beliefs are relevant to an ethical consideration, because “any belief introduced into the argument must be likely to cause one party or the other to have a different attitude. But beliefs that are likely to change attitudes on both sides. will have no influence on the disagreement of attitude that both parties face in the first place” (1948b, 4-5; see also 1944, 14).
Second, disagreement in attitude determines when an ethical problem is resolved: an ethical problem is essentially constituted by disagreement or insecurity in attitude, although it is often also constituted by disagreement or uncertainty in faith. Solving an ethical problem therefore requires the coordination of attitudes, sometimes through the coordination of beliefs that causally influence those attitudes. Attitudes can be coordinated by methods that do not involve the use of language; physical violence, corruption and physical seduction are just a few non-linguistic ways to shape and coordinate attitudes. However, Stevenson is only interested in linguistic methods of coordinating attitudes, which can be used to distinguish at least two questions: (i) How can language be used (and how has it been used) to coordinate attitudes? and (ii) How should language be used to coordinate parameters? The latter is itself a normative issue and is therefore outside the scope of Stevenson`s project. The first is a metaethic question and therefore the one Stevenson would most like to answer. Stevenson classifies linguistic methods of coordinating attitudes as “rational” or “non-rational.” Rational methods attempt to shape or coordinate attitudes by using language to create reasons; Stevenson therefore aptly calls all of these methods “reason.” Non-rational methods seek to shape or coordinate attitudes by using language in a way other than the fabrication of reasons; Stevenson calls this set of methods “persuasion.” For Stevenson, language is an instrument or tool intended for specific purposes; Ethical language is therefore particularly suited to the central objectives of ethics. Since the central purpose of ethics is to dissolve or coordinate attitudes, an analysis of ethical language must show how ethical language serves these dynamic goals. It does so, Stevenson says, by having emotional meaning in addition to descriptive meaning, with paid meaning in “pragmatic” or disposition terms as a network of causal relationships that exist between language and psychology. Another issue concerning the importance of the figures concerns the independence of the relevant opinions. Our beliefs are shaped by a number of factors, and not all of them are epistemically relevant.
Certain religious beliefs, political beliefs and even philosophical beliefs correlate with growing up in certain regions or attending certain schools. For this reason, it may be thought that the consent of persons who have spoken independently on an issue matters more, epistemically speaking, than the consent of individuals with broader common experience. For more information on this topic, see Carey & Matheson 2013, Goldman 2001 and Lackey 2013b. Advocates of these conciliatory views have reacted in different ways. First, some point out that the way these views are self-destructive is not a way to show that these views are false or incapable of being true. “No true sentence has more than 5 words” can also be called self-destructive, but this is another type of defeat. At worst, the consequence of accommodating opinions is that they cannot reasonably be believed in certain circumstances, but such an inability to be reasonably believed does not prove their lie. Moreover, a skeptical attitude toward the epistemic meaning of disagreement seems to fit quite well with the spirit of these views (more on this below). After all, skepticism about disagreement is exclusively epistemic. These were the epistemic reasons for representing a faith.
Fulfilling the conditions to recognize controversy raises a problem for these reasons, but we haven`t said anything about the moral, regulatory, or even religious reasons you might have for a controversial belief. The skeptical threat of disagreement concerns only our epistemic reasons. If there is a global standard of faith, skepticism about disagreement may have implications for that norm, but only by addressing the epistemic reasons one has for believing. Thus, for Stevenson, research or ethical consideration involves three general types of linguistic methods for resolving moral disagreements or uncertainties: (i) rational and logical methods; (ii) rational and psychological methods; and (ii) convincing methods. Another question concerns the question of which differences of opinion are of epistemic importance. Although actual disagreements between peers are rare or non-existent (see below), only one possible disagreement between peers is everywhere. Whatever faith you have, it is possible that an epistemic peer disagrees with you. .